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THE RULE IN RYLANDS v. FLETCHER.
III.
Mr. Justice Blackburn, in his opinion in Rylands v. Fletcher,
defines the substances, which can be collected by the land owner
only at his peril, as those likely to do mischief if they escape.
This definition is obviously far from precise or definite. Few
substances exist which may not under certain circumstances be
injurious. In England the following substances have been held
to fall within the rule: electricity,78 gas,77 sparks from an en-
gine,1 8 and fumes from creosoted wood blocks used in laying
a pavement upon a highway,79 and while no case actually brings
up the point, it seems that the storing of explosives should be held
to fall within the rule.80 It would seem that in all of these cases
that if the article stored should escape, that the probability of
damage to others is inherent in the very nature of the article
stored.
All these substances are such as by their very nature or in
accordance with the normal experience of mankind will cause
"National Telephone Co. v. Baker, L. R. 1893, 2 Ch. 186, and East &
South African Telephone Co. v. Cape Town Tramways Co., L R. i9o2 A. C.
38'.
"Batcheller v. Tunbridge Wells Gas Co., 17 Times L R. 577 (goi).
" Jones v. Festiniog, etc., Ry., L. R. 3 Q. B. 733 (i868).
"West v. Bristol Tramways Co., L R. 1898 2 K. B. r4.
See Clerk & Lindsell on The Law of Torts, 2d Ed. 375 (z896).
(423)
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harm if they escape."' There is no need to anticipate any ex-
ceptional conjunction of circumstances, in order to foresee that
if water or gas or electricity of high voltage should escape it
will do harm to those within its reach. The rule in Rylands v.
Fletcher applies only where the substances are such as are likely
to do harm under circumstances normally to be expected. It does
not apply unless the substance collected is one of its nature likely
to escape in obedience to well known and universally recognized
natural laws. It does not apply where the substance is stable
in its nature and so is such that, in order to bring it upon
another's premises, some force other than the operation of usual
natural laws and forces is required. In such case he who origi-
nally collected the substance upon his land is not for that reason
answerable for the harm it does. His liability depends on the
nature of the act, which carries or casts it upon the other's land,
and his legal responsibility therefor. He is not liable if it be
carried thereon by the unauthorized act of a stranger.8 2  And
while he may be answerable in trespass, if, as the direct result
even of his innocent acts, a substance ordinarily stable is thrown
upon another's property, he would, it seems, not be answerable,
if, as the indirect consequence of his lawful operations carefully
carried on, it is caused to fall thereon.
It is by no means certain whether bricks, stones or other
heavy substances built into walls or supported by them should
be regarded as falling within the principle of Rylands v. Fletcher.
In Berger v. Minneapolis Gas Co., 6o Minn. 297 (1895), an instruction,
that "every one who for his own profit keeps on his premises anything- not
naturally belonging there" is liable for the damage done by its escape, irre-
spective of the care he has exercised, was held to be too broad, "for it is
only those things the natural tendency of which is to become a nuisance or
do mischief, if they escape, which the owner keeps at his peril." So limited,
the rule is not open to the criticism of Doe, C. ., that, "Everything that a
man can bring on his land is capable of escaping-against his will, and with-
out his fault, with or without assistance, in some form solid, liquid, or
gaseous, changed or unchanged by the transforming processes of nature or
art-and doing damage after its escape."
I In Newberry v. Wilson, L. P_ 7 Q. B. 31 (187i), a declaration averring
that the defendant was possessed of yew trees, and that it was his duty to
prevent the clippings from being placed on land not occupied by him and that
he took so little care of the clippings that they were placed on land not
occupied by him, whereby the plaintiff's horse was poisoned, was held bad on
demurrer, since it was consistent with the declaration that the clippings might
have been carried upon the plaintiff's land by a stranger.
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Logically there seems no difference between water stored in a
reservoir and confined by banks and a heavy substance artificially
supported on high near to anothers land.83  The force of gravity,
which will, unless overcome by artificial means, cause the water
to overflow adjacent lands, will as inevitably cause the fall of a
heavy substance placed on high, unless similarly overcome by
artificial means, as by supporting it by a sufficient wall beneath
it or by firmly attaching it to some stable structure. No case,
however, goes to the extent of holding that one who carefully
erects a structure necessary to the enjoyment of his property,
in the manner customary and usual in that locality, is liable
without more for the fall of the material from it. There are,
it is true, dicta looking in this direction in Tarry v. Ashton,
84
but in that case the structure which fell was not a part of an
ordinary wall necessary for the residential use of the defendant's
property, but was a heavy projecting lamp which he had, either
for his business convenience or through some personal fancy or
from a, perhaps mistaken, idea of beauty, chosen to affix to his
wall. Not only was it an unusual structure, not necessary to
the normal enjoyment of his property, but it required altogether
exceptional mechanical means to keep it securely in place, and,
projecting as it did over the highway, it was evident that harm
to some member of the public was highly probable unless it was
effectively secured. It seems probable that if the question be
squarely presented, it will be held that the building of a wall does
not fall within the rule; or rather that it falls within the exception
thereto, announced by Lord Cairns; the building of walls being a
necessary incident to the residential and farming use of property
' See Clerk & Lindsell on Torts, 2d Ed., pp. 377-378.
R. iP i Q. B. D. 314 (1876). The point actually decided was that the
defendant who was aware that a lamp, projecting from his premises over a
highway, was in bad repair can not rid himself of his duty to put in good
repair by employing even a competent person to do it for him. But Lush, J.,
says: "Is it his duty to maintain it in a safe state of repair, or only to
employ a proper person to put it in repair? Surely the mere statement is
enough to show that the duty must be in the first proposition," and Quain, J.,
says, "it is his duty to keep it in such a state as not to prejudice the public."
Blackburn, J., doubted whether if a house fell by reason of "a latent defect
in the premises or something done to them without the knowledge of the
occupier" such occupier would be liable.
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which themselves are "natural uses" in the strictest sense of that
term.8 5
It seems quite certain that recovery in cases falling within
the principle of Rylands v. Fletcher is not confined to the harm
directly done by the substance and while it remains in the same
condition in which it left the defendant's premises. One, who
lays gas mains and pipes without statutory authority and so is
bound at his peril to prevent the gas from escaping, is as fully
liable for the harm done by the explosion of the gas when it
comes in contact with those fires, which as the ordinary incidents
of civilized life are to be foreseen, as-is he, who having statutory
authority, is only liable at all if the gas be negligently suffered
to escape.s6
Certain points seem to be definitely settled in England by
the cases decided since Rylands v. Fletcher, the results of which
may be summed up as follows: First: The substance which
escapes must have been collected upon the land by the defendant;
he must either have artificially brought it thereon, ,or by his
operations upon his land, have caused substances, naturally upon
the land, to be collected in such volume as to be dangerous to
others if they escape; thus, he is no more liable for the escape
from his land of substances naturally there, than he is for the
escape therefrom of wild animals, such as rats, rabbits or birds,
7
native thereto. And this is so where the substances have col-
lected in abnormal quantities by natural causes without any in-
terference by the land owner.83 So the land owner is not bound
to confine at his peril substances brought upon his land by the
act of God, nor is he liable, even though he has himself collected
upon his land, water or other substances, if, by reason of an
act of God, additional quantities thereof render the barriers
which he has provided, and which are sufficient- to confine the
matter which he himself has brought upon the land, prove in-
sufficient to prevent the escape of the total quantity so brought
"See the Massachusetts cases of Quinn v. Crimmins, and Ainsworth v.
Lakin, post.
" See Batcheller v. Tunbridge Wells Gas Co., ante, n. 77.
Warren v. Brady, 1900 2 Ir. Rep. 632.
"Hodgson v. The Mayor of York.
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against it. 9 Nor is the land owner bound to care for water
brought upon his land by strangers over whose conduct he has
no control, nor is he bound to provide barriers for substances,
which he himself collected, sufficient to withstand .additional sub-
stances so added thereto.90
Second: Although there is no direct authority, there are
many dicta to the effect that the land owner is not liable where
barriers sufficient to prevent the escape of the substance which
he has collected, are broken down91 by the act of God,92 or the
wrongful acts of third parties,9 3 or by any cause over which he
had no control.
94
'Nichols v. Marsland, L. R. io Exch. 255 (1875).
"Box v. Jubb, L. R. i C. P. 444 (1876).
"It is suggested in Clerk & Linsdell on the Law of Torts, second edition,
pages 376, 392, note a, that there is -a distinction between the escape of water
where the barrier is rendered insufficient by the increased pressure of the
water brought against it by the act of God or other stranger, and those cases
where it is not required to withstand any additional substances so brought to
bear upon it, but where, by the act of God or by the act of a stranger, it is
so weakened as to be unable to withstand the pressure of the water collected
by the defendant himself. At first glance there may appear to be a difference
between the two; a part of the water in the first case is not the water brought
b the defendant himself upon his land, but the damage is, in part if not prin-
cipally, done by the water which he has collected and which is thus by
superior force released. Unless one is prepared to contend that the defend-
ant is liable only where the damage is solely attributable to his acts, there
seems no real distinction between insufficiency of the barrier because of the
abnormal pressure put upon it and its insufficiency because abnormally
weakened. In each case the defendant's duty is to have a barrier actually
sufficient to restrain the water which he collected, in each case the barrier
proves insufficient and in each case the defendant is relieved because the in-
sufficiency is due to the act of God or some other person over whose conduct,
like that of God, is beyond his control.
"Per Bramwell, B., in Nichols v. Marsland, ante.
"Kelley, C. B., in Box v. Jubb, ante,
"In Carstairs v. Taylor, L. R. 6 Exch. 217 (1871), Kelley, C. B., regards
the act of a rat in gnawing a hole in a wooden conduit pipe as "vis major as
much as if a thief had broken the hole on attempting to enter the house or
a flash of lightning or a hurricane had caused the rent." In Cooley on Torts,
680, 3d Ed. p. 186, these cases are regarded as in effect making the proprietor
liable only if he fails to exercise "care proportioned to risk of injury from
the esaape." since they hold that he "is not liable if the water escapes from"
any "cause consistent with the observance of due and reasonable care by him.'
In this respect the liability of one who collects foreign substances upon his
land differs from that of the keeper of a wild animal or even of a domesti-
cated animal known by him to be vicious, in which case he is liable if the
animal though sufficiently secured is set at large by the wrongful act of
one for whom the custodian is not legally responsible, Vredenburg v. Behan,
33 La. Ann. 627 (i88i) ; Laverone v. Mangianti, 41 Cal. 138 (1871).; Baker
v. Snell, L. M i9o8, 2 K. B. 352, 825, or by the act of God, as where lightning
breaks the chain confining a tiger, per Bramwell, B., Nichols v. Marsland, L.
R. 1o Exch. 255 (1875), at p. 260,.
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Third: The defendant must have brought the substance
upon his land, or collected them there by operations done thereon,
for his own purposes and of his own volition. So he is not liable,
(a) if, the substance is collected or stored for the use of the
plaintiff, with his knowledge and consent, as shown by his avail-
ing himself of it, or for the joint uses and benefit of both the
plaintiff and the defendant, 5 (b) or if required by law" or the
terms of the tenure '7 upon which he holds his property to collect
and store it, (c) or if it be collected or stored as a necessary means
of carrying out some use of his premises, or of 'carrying on
operations, directed or authorized by legislative enactment.98
Fourth: Since the defendant's liability arises from the fact
that he had in the course of an unnatural use of his property and
'So a landlord is not liable if a cistern, maintained for the supply of
water to his tenant, bursts and injures the tenant's goods. Blake & Co. v.
Woolf, L. R. i898, a Q. B. 426, and cases cited therein. In Kentucky it is held
that while the escape of electricity is per se evidence of negligence in its cus-
tody when it injures a person upon the highway, Owensboro v. Knox's Adm.,
1x6 Ky. 451 (i896), it is not so when the person injured is a customer for
whose use electricity is supplied, Mangan's Adm. v. Louisville Electric Co.,
122 Ky. 451 (19o3).
"While no case presents this precise point, this would appear to be so,
for one, who as the keeper of the National Zoological Garden, was required
to keep wild beasts, the liability of whose custodian is more stringent than
that of a landowner who collects foreign substances upon his land (see note
93, ante), is held liable for their escape only if guilty of negligence. As to the
liability of a carrier for injuries done by wild animals which it is transporting,
see Malloy v. Starin, x9i N. Y. 21 (19o7).
"In Madras Ry. Co. v. Zemindar of Carvatenagrum, L. R. x Indian App.
Cases 364 (1874), the defendant, who was charged by the Indian law, by rea-
son of his tenure as Zemindar, with the maintenance of the tanks forming part
of the ancient irrigation system, was held not liable, in the absence of negli-
gence, for the escape of the water therefrom. Where, however, a landowner
is bound by prescription to receive foreign matter, he is bound at his peril
to keep it from escaping, Humphries v. Cousins, L. R. 2 C. P. 243 (1877);
here, however, the duty to receive it is a servitude to which the supiness of
himself or of his predecessors in title has subjected him.
"In Price v. Metropolitan Gas Co., 65 L. J. Q. B. i26 (895), Lord
Russell of Killowen says, at p. 127, "it is clear that where a gas company,
having statutory authority to lay pipes, does so in the exercise of its statutory
powers, the "wild beast" theory referred to in the well-known case of Rylands
v. Fletcher is inapplicable." So a railway having statutory power to use
steam as motive power is not liable for sparks escaping from their properly
constructed and carefully operated locomotive engines, Vaughan v. Taff
Vale Ry. Co., 5 H. & N. 679 (i86o); see also East & South African Tel. Co.
v. Cape Town Tramways Co., L, R. 19o2, A. C. 38r. The defendant must
show statutory power to do the particular thing complained of, West v.
Bristol Tramways Co., L. R. i9o8, 2 K. B. x4, such power will not be implied,
unless the thing done is necessary to carry out the work authorized, it is not
enough that it is convenient or profitable, see McAndrews v. Collerd, 42 N. J.
L 189 (i88o).
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for purposes of his own, peculiar to himself, collected thereon
substances likely to escape and injurious if they do escape, it fol-
lows that the plaintiff cannot recover where his only injury is
the interference with his equally unnatural and peculiar use of his
own land.a9
In the later English cases the application of the rule in Ry-
lands v. Fletcher is not limited to cases of injury resulting from
"use by a person of land belonging to him," 100 nor is any dis-
tinctiou made between cases of "abiding nuisances" and cases
where, as in Rylands v. Fletcher itself, harm results from some
conduct of the defendant or some condition created by him which
was not harmful to the plaintiff until the accident occurred, it be-
ing regarded as decisive of the one class of case as fully as of
the other.
The attitude of the-English law is strikingly exhibited in the
opinion of Fletcher Moulton, L. J., in the recent case of Wing
v. The Omnibus Company; 102 to him actions "of the type
' So in East and South African Tel. Co. v. Cape Town Tramways Co.,
L R. i9o2, A. C. 381, it was held that a tramway company was not liable for
the disturbance of the working of the plaintiff's submarine cables by elec-
tricity escaping from its wires, see accord, the very similar case of Lake
Shore & M. C. R. R. v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 92 N. E. 989 (Indiana, Nov. xA,
x91o).
'In West v. Bristol Tramways Co., supra, 11. 79, the defendant was a
company laying the pavement on a highway upon which the plaintiff's prem-
ises abutted, and in Batcheller v. Tunbridge Wells Gas Co., supra, n. 77, the
escape of gas from pipes under the highway was held to fall within the
authority of Rylands v. Fletcher.
" In many of the cases, in which the rule has been held decisive, the
injury was due to some continuously harmful condition created by the de-
fendant or some systematic course of injurious conduct, which amounts to
an enjoinable nuisance, East, etc., African Tel. Co. v. Cape Town Co., supra,
n. 99; Batcheller v. Tunbridge Wells Gas Co., supra, n. 77; in the latter case
the act, which authorized the defendants to lay their pipes, contained a section
providing that they should remain liable for any "nuisance" caused by them.
It was held that "the case was governed by what Lord Cairns had said in
Rylands v. Fletcher. The laying the pipes was a non-natural use of the land
and the company laid pipes at its peril."
' L R. 1909. 2 K. B. 652. p. 662, et seq., especially pp. 665 to 667. The
plaintiff, a passenger in one of the motor omnibuses of the defendant com-
pany, sued for injuries received by reason of the omnibus skidding into
collision with a electric light standard. The trial Judge held that there was
no evidence to go to the jury upon the first issue, which raised the question
of negligence in the operation of the omnibus, but on the second issue, which
was based on "the negligence of the defendant in placing upon the highway
a vehicle likely to be uncontrollable in certain slippery conditions of the
roadway and so creating a nuisance." the jury found the defendants guilty
of negligence in so doing in view of the known tendency of the best made and
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usually described by reference to Rylands v. Fletcher," are cases
of nuisance which, in effect, he defines to be an "excessive use
of some private right whereby a person exposes his neighbour's
property or person to danger." In such case, he says, "should
accident happen therefrom even through the intervention of an
event, for which he is not responsible, and without negligence
on his part, he is liable for the damage." "While the best known
cases of this type are associated with the use of a person with
land belonging to him, as when a man collects a large volume of
water upon his land, or carries on some dangerous manufacture
there," he holds "that analogous causes to action exist," when
an excessive use is made of any other private right, as "when
a member of the public makes undue and improper use of the
right which he enjoys in common with all others of using the
* public high way for traffic." 103 "The doctrine of Rylands v.
Fletcher, as applied to such cases," is in his opinion-"that if
there be such a nuisance, the fact that no one has chosen to seek
by legal process the complete remedy of stopping it (or that the
plaintiff could not by legal process have stopped it, it being only
potentially and not actually harmful to him or so dangerous as
operated motor omnibuses to skid when the roads are slippery. Vaughan
Williams and Buckley, L, JJ., treated the question as one of negligence, the
former holding that there was no evidence of negligence in using such a
vehicle, "having regard to the fact that motor omnibuses have been running
in the streets of the metropolis for years," the latter holding that the case
was one for the jury. Fletcher Moulton, L. J., treated the question as one
of nuisance to be determined by the application of the rule in Rylands v.
Fletcher. "The so-called negligence of the defendants in allowing their omni-
bus to run when the roads were in a greasy state, must mean," he says, "that
they ought not to have done so because, when so run, the omnibus consti-
tuted a nuisance. All else to which it can refer must be covered by the first
issue which has already been disposed oi" But he comes to the conclusion
that there is nothing which points to any particular class of vehicles "as being
so unsuitable for use in street traffic as to constitute a nuisance" or "call into
play the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher" and "no jury is entitled mero
motu to pronounce that a vehicle like a motor omnibus," which had become
a usual means of conducting traffic and as such is duly licensed by the
authorities and which, while in some ways more dangerous than horse-drawn
vehicles are in other respects safer, "is a nuisance without proper evidence."
'"If," he says, "a man places on the streets vehicles so wholly unman-
ageable as necessarily to be a continuing danger to other vehicles, either at
all times or under special conditions of weather, I have no doubt that he does
so at his peril, and that he is responsible for injuries resulting therefrom.
even though there has been no negligence in the management of the vehicle."
In view of the rapid growth of aviation this opinion is of much importance,
airships seeming to fall within the precise terms of the definition of vehicles
which can be operated only at the operator's risk.
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to warrant its prohibition),104 does not interfere with the liability
of the author of the nuisance occasioned thereby."
The collection by a land owner of foreign substances upon
his land, or his carrying on of a dangerous business, is regarded
as a species of nuisance, perhaps one might call it an incomplete
nuisance, a nuisance as it were held in suspense, not of itself un-
lawful, and so preventable by legal process, or actionable until
harm actualy results from it. This conception differs radically
from that prevalent in the majority of American jurisdictions; in
the latter "nuisance" is defined in accordance with the procedure
originally appropriate to give legal redress to a land owner for
harm done him by his neighbor and so requires that there shall
be created a condition existing for an appreciable time after it
is seen to be injurious to an adjacent owner or to the public, for,
otherwise, no assize of nuisance, the early remedy, the primary
object of which was to remove the offending condition, could
have lain, since, after the condition was found to be injurious,
there would be nothing left to remove. In England the idea of
nuisance is not restricted by these procedural limitations, but is
defined by the substantive nature of the defendant's conduct and
of its effect upon others.
Nuisance thus broadly defined is an excessive use by one
person of some private right of his own whereby he has exposed
the person or property of another to danger, the word neighbor
being used in a broad sense, and including all persons brought
into contact with the danger, in the exercise of their idependent
rights, which they enjoy irrespective of the defendant's permis-
sion or consent, such as the owners of property adjacent to that
of the defendant and persons exercising, as members* of the
public, their right to travel upon the public highways. So stated the
rule of Rylands v. Fletcher does not impose exceptional obli-
gations upon owners of real property, but is itself an instance of
the general principle that every excessive use of a private right
which in its nature threatens harm to others, who are themselves
'" That this is so appears from his statement earlier in his opinion, that
it is not necessary to decide whether a state of things entailing such conse-
quences (constant probability of danger to others) "might not also be
stopped by legal process," this he says is "generally but not universally the
case."
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in the enjoyment of their own independent fights, is a nuisance
of cognate thereto. If harm results to such other, he has the
right to compensation, whether he has or has not the right to stop
by legal process the state of things which has threatened the harm,
or having the right to stop it, he has not seen fit to avail himself
of it. But in every case the question remains whether the defend-
ant has or has not committed a nuisance in this.broad sense of
that term, that is to say, whether his use, whether of his property
or of the highway, or of any other right of his, has not only
threateried injury to others in the exercise of their independent
rights, but has been excessive. It not merely attempts to furnish
a general test by which to determine the proper line to be drawn
between conflicting rights and interests, but it has the great ad-
vantage of reducing the question to be solved ih each case to two;
the first, whether the use of the defendant's right is one which,
even if care be taken, can be foreseen as likely to imperil others;
second, whether such use is improper and excessive. It cannot be
expected that this rule will furnish a standard so definite and
certain that by it every state of facts will be automatically
settled. The question whether the particular use is to be regarded
as excessive or improper is one which will undoubtedly be an-
swered in different ways in different jurisdictions, in accordance
with the differing opinion therein prevalent upon economic and
social question. But within each jurisdiction the test will be the
same, whether the harm for which the plaintiff complains is
the continuous invasion of his property or the equally continuous
interference with his enjoyment of it, or is a single sudden harm
done to it once for all, or is caused by some vehicle which the
defendant choses to operate upon the public highway or in a
public place. However much the test may vary with the economic
attitudes prevalent in the various jurisdictions, in each juris-
diction the same test will be applied to determine the liability
for the harm which one does by all one's individual activities;
if the activity of one which is so essential to the public good that
it must be encouraged by allowing it to be prosecuted at the cost
of others, one carrying it on will be as much relieved from liabil-
ity for harm which it necessarily and directly does as from liability
for the harm which originally was merely probable but has in
THE RULE IN RYLANDS v. FLETCHER
fact actually resulted. On the other hand, if the business is not
so essential to the public welfare that it should be judicially
licensed to injure others without compensation, it will be no'more
permitted to throw the risk of probable harm to others upon them
than it will be allowed to throw upon them the burden of bearing
the injuries necessarily incident to its operations.
Thus understood the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher marks a
great advance in the rationalization of the common law. In
it, and the cases which have construed and applied it, the
English courts have released themselves from the bonds of the
purely procedural definition of the law of torts; under it it is
possible to allow to the individual freedom to enjoy his property,
or to exercise his activity as he may conceive that his interests
demand and at the same time to see to it, that he shall do so at
his own cost and not at the cost of others who are not interested
in his individual successes. The court is no longer confronted
with the alternative of prohibiting the exercise of the fullest
individual initiative and so retarding the advance of civilization,
which can best be forwarded by such means, and on the other
hand allowing the individual, because it is to the interest of
the common good that his individual activities should be en-
couraged, to seek his own advantage at the cost and at the risk
of others whose own rights bring them in reach of his acts, so
long as he carries on his activities with reasonable care. It
recognizes degrees in dangers, no action is prohibited unless it is
immediately injurious to the person or property of another, or so
dangerous as to actually affect the value of his property, but-at the
same time it recognizes that there are certain dangerous activities
which, while the dangers incident thereto are not so great as
to require their prohibition, should be carried on only at the risk
of him who profits by them.
While the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher has been approved in
many American jurisdictions, 10 5 only a very small proportion
' Ball v. Nye, 99 Mass. 582 (z868) ; Shipley v. Fifty Associates, xo6 Mass.
194 (871); Wilson v. New Bedford, io8 Mass. 261 (z872); Mears v. Dole,
I35 Mass. 5a8 (i883); Cahill v. Eastman, iS Minn. 292 (x872); Berger v.
Minneapolis Gaslight Co, 6o Minn. 296 (1895); Defiance Water Co. v.
Olinger, 54 Ohio St 532 (i89o). In Kinnaird v. Standard Oil Co., 89 Ky.
469 (i89o), and Parker v. Larson, 86 Cal. 236 (A8go), the Court uses general
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of the cases has presented a state of facts requiring its applica-
tion to determine the liability of the defendant. In Wiltse v.
City of Red Wing,10 a city was held liable without proof of
negligence, for the damage done by the bursting of the reservoir;
in Bradford Glycerine Co. v. St. Mary's Woolen Company,10 7
one storing nitroglycerine on his land was held liable for the
damage done by its explosion; in Brennan Construction Com-
pany v. Cumberland, s08 one, for his business purposes, storing
crude petroleum in a tank upon his premises was held liable for
the damage done to shipping by its escape, without negligence,
through a broken valve into an adjacent river, and in Overall
v. Louisville Electric Light Company,109 the defendant was held
bound to provide perfect insulation of its wires so as to insure
the public from injury by the escape of its electricity. But in
the great majority of cases in which the rule has been approved
the facts did not require its application because the defendant in
his use of his premises had created a condition continuously
injurious to the plaintiff and so an "abiding nuisance," under
the strictest and most technical definition of nuisance, for which
he would have been liable in the majority of those jurisdictions
which repudiate Rylands v. Fletcher, or because actual negli-
gence was alleged or proved; or the rule though cited with ap-
proval was held, for a variety of reasons, to be inapplicable.
In Massachusetts where the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher has
been consistently approved and constantly cited as authority, this
expressions similar to the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, but in neither of them
is that case cited and in neither of them do the facts require its application,
the damage complained of being done by the continuous percolation of oil or
water from the defendant's premises.
1"099 Minn. 256 (go6).
6o Ohio St. 56o (i89g).
10829 App. Cases Dist. of Columbia, 554 (19o7). In the very recent case
of Weaver Mercantile Co. v. Thurmond, 7o S. E. 126 (W. Va., i8ix), it
was held that one who had accumulated a large quantity of water in a tank
upon his premises was liable for the damage done by its escape. The opinion
of the court leaves it doubtful whether the defendant's liability is regarded
as resting upon some negligent failure to keep the tank in proper repair, of
which the bursting of the tank is prima facie evidence, or upon the rule in
Rylands v. Fletcher, which is cited at length and with approval. It would
seem that upon the facts the defendant's liability can be supported only upon
the latter theory.
1n 20 Ky. L. L 759 (1898), 47 S. W. 442.
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is strikingly so. In Ball v. Nye,110 the walls of the defendant's
cesspool had been for a long time out of repair, and the filth
had continuously invaded his neighbor's premises; indeed he is
assumed to have known of its intrusion and so to have been
guilty of actual negligence. In Shipley v. The Fifty Asso-
ciates,11 the roof and gutters upon the defendant's premises
• Mass. 582 ( •868). This is the first case in Massachusetts in which
Rylands v. Fletcher is cited as authority. So in the case of Defiance Water
Company v. Olinger, while Chief Justice Bradbury said that the rule in
Rylands v. Fletcher was "in accordance with justice and sound reason," the
declaration in effect averred negligence in the construction and maintenance
of the defendant's water tank, the bursting of which caused the plaintiff's
injury; so that, as the Chief Justice himself said, there was no reason for its
application.
l io6 Mass. 94 (187) ; Ames J., says, p. 198, "if the defendants had con-
structed a reservoir in their attic, to be filled by the rain, they would clearly
be liable for damage occasioned to their neighbor by the breaking down of
such a reservoir. In Fitzpatrick v. Welsh, 174 Mass. 486 (x899), a case in
which rain water flowed from the roof of the defendant's stable into the
gutter thereon, and was discharged through a hole therein after every rain
upon the plaintiff's land, Shipley v. Fifty Associates, is cited as an instance
of the general rule applicable to both cases, which is stated by Holmes, C. J.,
in effect as follows: One who arranges his premises in such a way that it
will manifestly collect water (or snow), which, unless prevented, will be
discharged upon another's land, "has notice that he threatens harm to his
neighbor" "so manifest, so constant, and so great" that the law will not per-
mit him knowingly to inflict" it and he-is bound to prevent at his peril the
harm from coming to pass. In Clifford v. Atlantic Cotton Mills, 146 Mass.
47 (1888), it was held, the same judge giving the opinion, that the tenant,
not the landlord, of the structure, practically identical with that in Shipley's
case, was liable for the injury to a person walking along the highway by the
falling of snow upon him. The reason given is that the structure, as such,
was not a nuisance, but was liable to become such by the mere workings of
nature alone, unless the tenant cleared the roof or took other steps tonre-
vent it, which, by the exercise of reasonable care, he might have done. The
court citing cases to the effect, that a landlord is not liable because a tenant
by the wrongful use of the premises creates a nuisance, holds that "it does
not matter whether the wrong on the part of* the tenant is an act which
makes the premises a nuisance or an omission which allows them to become
so." It may be here suggested that, even admitting that the landlord is not
liable because a structure, which when turned over to the tenant threatens
no harm to others, is, by reason of the tenant's failure to keep it in .repair
as he is legally bound to do, allowed to become so ruinous as to be a nuisance,
the case presents a different question, for, while the structure when trans-
ferred was not a nuisance, it was certain to become so by the mere working
of nature alone. The tenant has not allowed the premises, turned over to
him in good repair, to get into a condition where the mere operation of nat-
ural forces makes them injurious to others, he has merely failed to intervene
and so avert the harm which the premises as transferred to him threatened
to inflict in the ordinary course of nature.
This decision not only decides that the wrong doer is entitled to expect
that others more considerate than he will avert the harm which his miscon-
duct threatens, but it sheds a flood of light upon the Court's conception of
liability for the escape of foreign substances artificially collected upon property.
The liability is, it seems, not attached to the creation of the condition, on the
contrary, it is held to depend upon the breach of a duty incideft to the occu-
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were so constructed that, whenever the snow fell, which it did
every winter to a greater or less extent, it collected upon the
roof and, unless removed, from time to time fell upon the
plaintiff's premises. Here the invasion of the plaintiff's premises
was not continuous or uninterrupted, but it was practically
certain to occur a number of times during the winter, though
not always with the same frequency or to the same extent. In
Wilson v. New Bedford 12 and Mears v. Dole,' 13 the defend-
ant's operations caused water to percolate continuously into the
plaintiff's land ;114 the difference between the two cases being
that in the former, the defendant had built a reservoir for the
very purpose of collecting the water, while in the latter, sea
water had entered and collected in excavations made in the shore
of the defendant's land, which excavations were made not for
the purpose of collecting the water, but to extract gravel for sale.
The earliest case in Minnesota in which the rule in Rylands
v. Fletcher was approved, is in Cahill v. Eastman;11-3 in it the
court applied the rule therein to the following circumstances:
The defendant had for his own purpose dug a tunnel under the
bed of the Mississippi River, and under the site of the plaintiff's
mill pond. This tunnel was dug at a depth of thirty feet below
the bed of the river. In October, 1869, the water of the river
burst into the tunnel and rushed through it in great volume,
tearing away the earth at its top and sides to a considerable
extent. The inflow of the river was finally stopped, but in
April, 187o, during an ordinary spring freshet, the water again
burst into the tunnel, rushing through with such violence as to
undermine and wash out the bank of the river upon which the
plaintiff's mill was situated. The defendants contended that
pancy of land, upon which such substances have been collected or which are
in such a condition as in the ordinary courses of nature to cause such sub-
stances to collect, to either get rid of such substances already collected, or
to prevept them from collecting in such quantities as to be dangerous, or
in the alternate to see to it that they are effectively prevented from escaping.
2Io8 iMass. 261 (1871).
23 135 Mass. 508 (z883).
" So in Berger v. Minneapolis Gas Co., 6o Minn. 296 (i895), the oil from
the defendant's reservoir had percolated continuously into the plaintiff's
premises.
2" 18 Minn. 292 (1872).
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they were not liable in the absence of proof of negligence or
unskilfulness in the construction or maintenance of the tunnel.
But the court held that they, having dug the tunel under the
plaintiff's land, must answer for it that it should not be the
occasion of harm to the plaintiff's property.
This case does not, in fact, appear to involve the principle
in Rylands v. Fletcher, which deals only with the liability of
one intentionally bringing upon his land foreign substances likely
to escape unless effectively restrained, or, at the most, of one
whose operations obviously tend to a reasonable probability to
cause such substances to collect thereon. It has no application
to the above facts unless extended so as to hold a landowner
liable for the escape of foreign substance which his operations
on his land have, however unexpectably, caused to accumulate
thereon. In fact, the decision seems to be more properly based
upon the cases, also cited as authority for the result reached,
which hold that a landowner's right to lateral and surface
support of his land is an absolute right of property, the in-
fringement of which is, in itself and without more, actionable. In
such case it is enough that the defendant has by his excavations
undermined the plaintiff's land, it is no excuse that the excava-
tions were carefully made or that there was no reason to expect
that they would cause the subsidence which actually results.
The defendant is liable for the harm actually resulting from his
operations, without the intervention of the act of God or zis
major; it is no excuse that it was unexpected or even unexpect-
able, or that it was due to some unknown condition of the soil
lying between the place where the excavation was made and that
where the subsidence occurred. 116
There is a distinct tendency in those American jurisdictions
which have -approved the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher and even
those which have followed it in cases requiring its application,
"'It is to be noted also, that as the right of the landowner to have his
soil remain in the position in which nature placed it is absolute, it is no defense
that the subsidence was caused by the excavations made by the defendant in
the course of his "natural" use of his land. He is as much liable where he
causes his neighbor's land to subside by his farming operation, by digging
a cellar or by the removal of the mineral support to surface land in the usual
course of careful mining (Robertson v. The Company, 172 Pa. 566, 1896), as
he would be had the excavations been made for any other purpose.
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to either withdraw their approval and to repudiate it in toto or to
limit its application. In Owensboro v. Knox's Adm.1 ' the
Supreme Court of Kentucky in effect overruled Overall v. Com-
pany 1 s and held that there is no liability for the escape of
electricity from wires upon a public highway unless there has
been a failure to exercise that high degree of care which those
dealing with so dangerous a substance are bound to observe.
And in California it-was held in Judson v. Giant Powder Co."' 9
that one storing explosives in a proper place, is only liable for
their explosion if he fails to exercise proper care in their cus-
tody, though in both cases the explosion of the gun powder or
the escape of the electricity is regarded as in itself sufficient evi-
dence of negligence.
In Langabaugh v. Anderson,120 a defendant, who had, as
lessee of oil wells, stored crude petroleum in a tank, which,
without negligence, burst, discharging the petroleum upon the
plaintiff's land, from which it spread to the adjacent land of a
third party, where, coming in contact with fire thereon, it was
ignited, was held not to be liable for the burning of the plain-
tiff's buildings in consequence of the fire spreading back along
the track of the petroleum.
The opinion is by no means clear. On one page the court,
in an effort to distinguish the case in hand from Bradford Co. v.
St. Mary's Co., appears to draw a distinction between substances
which are "in all places and under all circumstances dangerous,"
which "are made for their dangerous qualities and are bought
and sold and used as explosives," and whose owners therefore
"assume at once the liability of their accomplishing natural and
probable results" and substances such as crude petroleum. Yet,
on the next page, Rylands v. Fletcher is held to be good author-
ity for holding the defendant liable had the plaintiff complained
only of the damage directly done him by the flooding of his
premises by the petroleum. But it is said to be no authority
for holding the defendant liable for any consequential injuries,
UT 116 Ky. 451 (19o3).
'Ante, n. io4.
"'Oo7 CaL s49 (8.95).
1"68 Ohio St. 131 (1903).
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for any indirect results of the invasion no matter how natural
or even probable.121  One might therefore regard the distinc-
tion, tentatively drawn between substances whose dangerous
qualities give them commercial value and those whose value is
not so determined, as being as unimportant as it is unsound, 122
were it not for the fact that in the case of Marsh v. Lake
Shore Electric Railway,1 23 one of the Circuit Courts of Ohio
held that the electricity being, like steam, a substance valuable
not because of its danger, but because of its usefulness, those
using it are not insurers of the safety of others coming into
contact with it, but should only be "held to the exercise of care
commensurate with its deadly qualities."
In practically all the American jurisdictions which have
approved Rylands v. Fletcher, there is, as might perhaps be
expected in view of the prevalent economic attitude of the courts
3MThe distinction between articles whose commercial value depends upon
their dangerous qualities and those whose value is not so determined is based
upon a merely superficial difference. The important fact is whether they
are dangerous if they escape and whether, unless artificially confined, they are
likely to escape in obedience to ordinary natural laws. What they will
accomplish when removed from the defendant's premises and carefully used
by others is quite beside the question. The distinction is of the same vicious
sort as that drawn by Sanborn, J., in Huset v. Case Machine Co., i2o Fed.
865 (I9O3), between "articles intended to preserve or affect human life"
and articles which unless carefully made will be dangerous for the use for
which they are sold as suitable, in determining the liability of the maker for
injury to one not his immediate vendee, as to this see 53 American Law
Register, pp. 357 to 364.
' It is noted that the defendant, who was the lessee of the oil well, had
covenanted with his lessor to replace the latter's house if it was destroyed by
fire caused by his negligent operation of the well. While, as the Court points
out, this only covers the destruction of the house by negligence, it shows
clearly that the defendant's attention was called to the danger from fire if
his operations should miscarry and the oil should escape. And while the
covenant to which the plaintiff was not a party could not create rights in him
or obligations to him, the existence of a contract, to which the defendant
is a party though the plaintiff is not, may be a very important evidential
fact, as showing whether the defendant or some third party is bound to repair
a structure, Payne v. Rogers, 2 Hy. Blackstone 349 (1749); Quinn v. Crim-
mins, 171 Mass. 255 (i898), or as here that a particular consequence of' the
miscarriage of his business was foreseen by him.
In85 Ohio Circuit Court Rep. N. S. 405 (i9o5). The case might well have
been decided on the ground that the use of electricity was a necessary inci-
dent to operations authorized by legislative sanction, see Price v. Metropolitan
Gas Co., ante, n. 98. The whole decision also shows that the great value of
electricity in the service of civilized mankind was regarded as a reason for
holding one, who employed it, answerable only upon proof of negligence; as
to which see The City Water Power Co. v. Fergus Falls, post, n. 126, and
Quinn v. Crimmins, post, n. r29.
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as exhibited in the cases, already given, which deal with the
right of a riparian owner to utilize the water of the stream flow-
ing by his land, a distinct tendency to repudiate the limitation
of the uses which may be made of land without liability for the
escape of foreign matter incidentally collected thereon to
"natural" uses in the sense in which Lord Cairns used that term
in Rylands v. Fletcher, and to hold that the rule announced by
Mr. Justice Blackburn should only apply to unusual and extra-
ordinary uses which are fraught with exceptional peril to others.
It is said that no liability attaches, unless negligence be proved,
where the defendant's use of his property "brings about new
conditions which involve risks to the person or property of
others, but which are ordinary and usual and in a sense natural,
as incident to the ownership of the land." 124 So it has been
held in Massachusetts that "the rule is not applicable to the
construction and maintenance of the walls of an ordinary build-
ing" (or of a fence) "near the land of an adjacent owner." 1a
In Ohio it was held, even before the court showed a disposition
to recede from their full approval of Rylands v. Fletcher, that
one who used steam on his premises was not responsible for
the bursting of a carefully selected and properly operated
boiler,126 and in a very recent case in Minnesota it was held
that the building of a dam across a stream to obtain power
for a mill was not "an unnatural or unusual use, but the con-
trary." 127 So, too, it was held in Missouri that, even if the
, Per Knowlton, J., in Ainsworth v. Lakin, i8o Mass. 397 (sgoz).
Ainsworth v. Lakin, ante, n. 123.
' Huff v. Austin, 46 Ohio St. 386 (x889). It is to be noted, that the
boiler was, like that in Losee v. Buchanan, ante, operated on the defendant's
private premises and not under statutory authority, as is the boiler of a
railroad locomotive engine. The case of Campbell v. Spencer, 9 W. & S.
(Pa.) 32 (1845), cited in the opinion, does not fall within the doctrine of
Rylands v. Fletcher, since the plaintiff was injured upon the defendant's land,
upon which he had come as a business guest.
27 City Water Power Co. v. The City of Fergus Falls, 128 N. W. 817
(Dec. x6, i9io). In Gould v. Winona-Gas Company, ioo Minn. 259 (1907), it
was held that a gas company was liable for escape of gas from its pipes only
upon proof of negligence. The Court rejects the argument that "the gas com-
pany is a public service corporation engaged in furnishing an essential of
modern city life which it may be compelled to do on terms, inasmuch as this
is a voluntary undertaking for profit." In fact the company was operating
under legislative authority which even in England would have protected it
from liability, see Price v. Gas Co., ante, 11. 98.
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rule in Rylands v. Fletcher were the rule in that state, the bring-
ing of water "into a house through pipes in the way usual in all
cities, for the ordinary use of the occupants," was widely dif-
ferent from tht collection of a great volume of water in a re-
servior, and while it could not perhaps be properly said to have
come on the premises in what Lord Cairns called "natural uses"
of the premises, yet it is "broujht in by the method universally
in use in cities and is not to be treated as an unnatural gathering
of a dangerous agent." 128
Two elements are often regarded either separately or to-
gether as of importance in determining whether the use is one
which is at the owner's risk or one for the consequences of
which he is liable only if guilty of personal negligence, or
whether, in some jurisdictions, in cases falling between the two
extremes, it is one, as to which he is bound to answer for it
that care shall be taken to prevent harm to others, whether he
attend to the matter personally or by others, such as his servants,
for whose acts he is legally responsible or by an independent
contractor over whose actions he retains no control and who
possesses the special skill which he himself lacks and which is
requisite for the proper performance of the work.
The first of these is the public interest, as shown by the
fact that the use is recognized by legislation as worthy of en-
couragement and protection, or as in each particular case judi-
cially determined "by the benefits to be derived from it and the
dangers or losses to which others are exposed." The fact that
dams were legislatively favored by the Mill Acts, appears to
have been regarded as important, if not decisive, in City Water
Power Co. v. Fergus Falls,129 and Holmes, J., says, in Quinn
v. Crimmins,13 0 that, "as it is desirable that buildings and fences
should be put up, the law does not throw the risk of thai act
-Valliant, J., in McCord Rubber Co. v. St. Joseph Water Co., i81 Mo.
678 (1904), P. 694. See also, Sutton and Ash v. Card, W. N. 1886 (Eng.), 120,
in which it is said that "there is a wide difference between permitting water
which a man has fouled himself to flow into his neighbor's premises, 
and
the leakage of fair water from a supply pipe without any negligence on his
part, such a mode of supply being the ordinary way of using a man's own
property."
2 Ante, n. 127."' 17 Mass. 255 (1898), P 258.
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any more than of other necessary conduct upon the actor, or
make every owner of a structure, insure against all that may
happen, however little to be foreseen." It would seem that on
principle the opinion of the legislature that mills ought to be
encouraged, or that of the court that buildings should be built,
should not be decisive that the risk thereof should be borne by
the neighbors rather than by him who owns the dam or build-
ing. There can be no doubt that it may well decide the question
as- to whether a structure threatening some danger, should or
should not be held to be unlawful and so removable by abate-
ment or injunction, but it is to be noted, that the very mill acts
alluded to, as showing the recognition of the public benefit
of mill dams, provide that the harm done by the flowing neces-
sary to their erection is to be borne not by the upper owners
whose land is flooded, but by the mill owner. Their object
is not to enable mills to be run at the cost of other riparian
owners, but simply to prevent them from being legally stopped
by them. 13'
The second element sometimes considered is the fact- that
the defendant has not brought on tie land any substance not
coming naturally thereon, but has merely utilized in a lawful
way (or even in a way not only sanctioned, but favored by the
law), a beneficial natural advantage incident to his land, or has
protected himself lawfully from a natural enemy.132  On this
mIt may perhaps be suggested that ,the encouragement of industry or
civic development at the cost of those ufifortunate enough to own property
near to the proposed improvement would appear less just had the public sense
of equal justice not become dulled by long continued contemplation of the
spectacle of the public, taxed upon practically every article it purchases in
order that domestic manufactures may be profitably carried on.
"aThe same distinction is found in many cases dealing with the liability
for continuous nuisance; so in Evans v. The Fertilizer Company, i6o Pa. 2N
(1894) the fact that the interference with the plaintiff's enjoyment of her
property arose from substances artificially brought upon the defendant's
land, and employed in his business is regarded as of great importance; see
also, Robb v. Carnegie, 145 Pa. 324 (89). In Parker v. Larson, 86
Cal. 236, (i89o) it was held that one who brought water by artificial means
(by artesian wells) upon his land must take care of it and not permit it to
injure his neighbor. The Court emphasizes the fact that the water that did
injury to his neighbor, was not a natural stream flowing across his land,
thus distinguishing the case from those cases in California and neighboring
States, which hold that one, who is utilizing the water naturally flowing
upon or by his property for the purpose of irrigating his land, is not liable,
in the absence of negligence, for the damage done to his neighbors by
percolations through the banks of the ditches required therefor.
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ground the Supreme Court of Minnesota distinguished The City
Water Power Co. v. Fergus Falls1 33 from Wiltse v. Red
Winge1 4 -holding that in the latter case the defendant had
artificially created the danger, as it were out of the whole cloth,
having brought the water by artificial means upon his premises
where it did not naturally belong, and that in the former it had
merely "impounded in a natural and usual way, for a public as
well as private use, the waters of a natural water course." So
in Jones v. Robertson, 135 it was held that a mine owner, who,
by artificial banks, had diverted into a new channel a stream,
which threatened to inundate his mine, was not liable because
he had not collected on his land any water not naturally there,
but had merely protected himself, as he lawfully might, against
a natural enemy already on his premises. Once accept the view
that the use of a riparian stream for the supply of mill power
is as natural and proper as is its use for farming or the view that
an owner is entitled to protect himself against a stream by
diverting it within his own boundaries and it would seem to
follow that the mill dam cases do not conflict, save to the above
extent, with Rylands v. Fletcher.
It will be noted that with the exception of the mill dam,
every one of these uses is not merely of benefit to the public
generally, it is a use usual to all the land in the neighborhood;
so it is a benefit to all the neighbors that land may be so
utilized without fear of legal liability. In a city practically
every one maintains on his property ordinary walls and fences,
in every house there are water pipes; the -very plaintiff whose
house is flooded by the escape of water from the bursting pipes
on his neighbor's premises. himself is using similar pipes to
supply his own house with water. In a word, such things as
buildings, walls, and fences, and the laying down of water pipes
for domestic uses, are inseparable incidents to the residential
use of all such property. The value of every city lot is en-
hanced by the right to so use it without liability so long as care
is exercised. There is not, therefore, merely the benefit to
'"Ante n. z27.
'H Ante n. io6.
iN 116 11. 543 (1886).
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the public generally in permitting the utmost freedom in such
uses, it is a distinct advantage to the very neighbors who them-
selves run the risk incident to the exercise of the defendant's
similar right. Such uses, therefore, while not "strictly natural"
in the sense in which Lord Cairns uses that term, are cognate
thereto and fall within the reason which have led the English
courts from time immemorial, to treat "natural uses" with
favor. These uses do not represent merely the owner's personal
choice of a use which he regards as best serving his interest; on
the contrary, they are the uses which all persons agree make
city land valuable. Perhaps, even in the ordinary case of damage
done by bursting mill dams, there is a practically similar situation,
for, while this is not invariably the case, it usually happens that
the very person who suffers is himself a mill owner whose dam
is carried away.
Perhaps it may not be obvious at first glance why all this
should make a difference, but it seems fair that one, who
personally profits by the privilege to use his land in a particular
way, may not complain of the result of the exercise of another's
similar right; while if the defendant's use be merely for the
benefit of the public generally, in which the adjacent owner
shares merely as one of the public, it seems that the latter should
bear no greater part of the damage done by that use than any
other member of the public, who, as such, share equally the
benefits derived from permitting it. To throw the whole of the
loss upon one member of the public, simply because it is his
misfortune that his property should be situated near to the place
which the defendant selects to carry on the business, tending
to increase the general prosperity, is, it seems to the writer, to
throw upon him a loss altogether out of proportion to his share
in the benefit derived from the encouragement of the industry.
If the public be interested, let the public as such bear the
loss,186 but if the neighbors have such profit by the business by
'"As a matter of abstract fairness it would seem, if the business is
one which is essential to the good of the State as a community and yet
is of a sort that would not attract private enterprise, if it were forced to
bear, as part of its operating expense, the cost not only of repairing the
damage which it does to its.own plant and property but also of making
good the harm which it causes to others, that the State itself should relieve
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reason of the fact that the 'right to carry on such business adds
value to their land, or because the valhe of their land is en-
hanced by the character of the locality due to the presence of
the business of this burden, either by paying for the loss itself or by re-
imbursing the business which itself is to make the payment. In either event
the payment would finally be made out of the public funds raised by taxation,
and as taxes are laid upon the wealth of the country, each citizen would pay
in proportion to his share in the general prosperity. So his share of the
payment necessary to encourage the operation of the business would cor-
respond to the benefit which he as a member of the public has derived from
its operations.
Every burden which an individual is forced to bear for the benefit of
the State i, in the last analviS, a species of taxation, and it is a funda-
mental principle that taxation shall be laid equally upon all benefited by the
expenditure of the fund realized thereby. If the fund is to be expended
to increase the general prosperity of all citizens, it must be borne by all in
proportion to their share in that prosperity as shown by their wealth. If
any particular class is to be peculiarly benefited by its expenditure, the whole
or the greater part of it may well be laid upon that class, so long as the
burden is borne equally by all of that class. If an individual derives peculiar
benefit from it he may be required to bear the entire burden. But it
violates every canon of taxation that the whole burden should be laid upon
some individual, having no peculiar interest in the object secured by its
expenditure, simply because of some accidental circumstance, such as the
location of his property. To throw the risk of a business essential to the
public interests upon a particular individual who derives no special bene-
fit therefrom, simply because the exercise of his rights brings him within
reach of its injurious effects, is not substantially different from the con-
duct of a Sultan of Morocco, who in order to raise funds for the carry-
ing on of a war, confiscates the property of the nearest rich man.
Twenty years ago the suggestion that the State should, as such, bear this
burden, would have been regarded as a wicked socialistic heresy or, what is
perhaps worse, a mere academic theory. The principle that one, whose
person or property had been injured for the public benefit, must himself
bear the loss, has from the earliest times been a principle of the common
law and has been extended to cases where the property of one man has
been sacrificed to preserve the property or the life of many. This concep-
tion seems to the writer to denote a crude state of jurisprudence prevalent
at a time when the State was regarded as a police officer, whose sole func-
tion was to see that individual citizens paid due regard to the rights of
their fellows; it is noteworthy that in the more advanced jurisprudence of
Rome, if one man's property were sacrificed to secure the safety of that of
many, the burden was equally distributed, by contribution, among all those
whose property was imperiled. This conception of the common law has
been preserved by the extreme individualistic attitude of the English people,
whose most marked political characteristic has been their intense jealousy of
the power of the State and their distaste of anything savoring of State
regulation or paternalism. This characteristic culminated in the doctrine by
laisser faire utilitarianism which dominated public opinion during the greater
part of the last century.
The reaction from the extremes to which this doctrine was carried, has
however in recent years led in England to an entirely different conception
of the proper functions of the State, and to an impulse in favor of what may
be called distributive justice. Much of recent English legislation is designed
to transfer the loss necessarily arising under the complicated conditions of
modern life to the public or to the person most benefited by the activities
which causes it, who, as such, is regarded as the person who should bear it,
or to distribute it through him among the public at large or least among
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the defendant's enterprise, 13 7 then, they being peculiarly bene-
fited, may be properly singled out to bear the loss. Nor is it to
the public interest to allow the business even though it be one
which conduces to the general prosperity, to be carried on at
the cost of the neighbor or of the public, unless the risks be so
great that no person be expected to engage in it on any other
terms. The margin of profit in a particular kind of business,
which may be essential for the satisfaction of some general want,
may be so small, or this sort of business so in its infancy, that
certain privileges may well be accorded to it, but it is certainly
not to the public interest that he who carries on any business
should be relieved from bearing the burden of -,he damage which
that business does, as part of the cost of its operation, merely
that his profits may be increased.
It has been seen that the same influences which led the
American courts to allow to the riparian owner a latitude of
permissible business use of the water of the stream, much
greater than is allowed in England, have resulted in a restricted
application of the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher even by those
courts which have adopted it. But, in the one case as in the
other, this has been due to the economic attitude of the courts
which has led them to relieve from all burdensome liabilities
those, who, in a usual and ordinary manner, develop and use
their property or who devote it to a use which in the opinion
that part of it, which being served by his activities, seems peculiarly interested.
Of this latter class the Working Men's Compensation Acts of 1897 and
i9o6 are conspicuous instances. While this tendency is not apparent to
anything like the same extent in America, signs of a similar case in the
public opinion is not entirely lacking. A movement for the adoption of
workmen's compensation acts, similar to that in force in England, has already
secured the passage of such an act in New York and the introduction
of like acts in the legislatures of many other States, and in the Noble State
Bank v. Haskel, 31 U. S. S. C. Rep. 186 (igii), the Supreme C6urt of the
United States has held constitutional an act imposing upon all banks of a
State the burden of contribution for the purpose of guaranteeing the solvency
of all such banks as a group.
'" So Bradbury, C. J., in Bradford Glycerine Co. v. St. Mary's Co..
ante, n. Io7, distinguishes between the storage of nitro-glycerine and the use
of a steam engine, inter alia, as follows: "The existence of a manufacturing
establishment, although it may employ steam as a motive power, may be and
doubtless in many instances is, a positive benefit to real property in the neigh-
borhood, while on the contrary the erection and use of a nitro-glycerine maga-
zine can have no other than a disastrous effect on the value of all real
property in the neighborhood."
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of the court serves the necessities of the community or tends
to increase the general prosperity. But while they require proof
of negligence before one, so utilizing his property, is to be held
liable for the harm done, yet there is an ever increasing tendency
to hold that the fault need not be that of the defendant himself
or of any one for whose general conduct he is legally responsible.
In a constantly increasing number of situations, one who has
caused work to be done for him by an independent contractor,
over whose conduct he has no control and whose-acts are no-
where regarded as his (as are the acts of his own servants),
is held responsible if, because of the negligence of such con-
tractor, the work let to him is badly done to another's harm.
And this is so though the work requires special technical skill
which the defendant himself cannot be expected to possess, and
though he has carefully selected a contractor of the highest
reputation for the possession of the requisite skill. It is evident,
therefore, that the defendant is not held liable because of any
supposed negligence in not doing the work himself, for nothing
could be more reckless than such an attempt, nor in failing to
retain the power to supervise the work, for it is evident that the
supervision of an expert by one knowing nothing of the matter
would not tend to secure a proper performance of the work.
The cases in which this liability has been imposed fall into
certain distinct classes, in some of which the liability may well
rest upon reasons peculiar to themselves, 138 but in others of
which it is not susceptible of such explanation. In one class of
case it is held that certain positive duties, such as that whicfi
an owner of property owes in respect to the repair of structures
so situate that if ruinous they would be injurious to his neigh-
bors,13 9 or that which one, who invites the public to frequent
"1It may well be that where the permission is given to break a highway
or a franchise granted to operate a railroad, there is a choice of the partic-
ular grantee as the person responsible for the results of the exercise of the
privilege. Again it may well be that liability of a carrier of passengers in
such cases is due to the peculiar nature of the relation. A carrier of goods
is well known to be an insurer against all damage except those which arise
from an act of God or the public enemies; the stringent duty of the carrier
of passengers may be derived from this duty and be a mere relaxation from it.
I"Tarry v. Ashton, ante, n. 84; Earl v. Reid, 21 Ont. L. R. 545 (i9io);
Gorham v. Gross, 125 Mass. 232 (1878); Cook v. Blossom. i62 Mass. 330
(i894); Ainsworth v. Lakin, i8o Mass. 397 (z9o2); McHarge v. Newcomer,
117 Tenn. 59s.
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his premises, owes in respect to its proper preparation for their
reception, 140 or that which one who furnishes chattels to another
for use in his, the supplier's, business owes to see that they are
fit for the purpose for which they are supplied,141 cannot be
delegated even to an independent contractor so as to relieve those,
on whom the duty originally lay, from liability to answer for
their proper performance. Other cases hold one, who has
caused work to be done by an independent contractor which
necessitates the creation dangerous to others till removed or
guarded, answerable for the failure of his contractors to remove
or guard the danger or in the alternative to give notice of its
existence so that it may be avoided. 142  The principle is carried
farthest in those cases which hold that one who lets out work,
dangerous unless preventive measures be taken, liable for the
independent contractor's failure to take the necessary precau-
tions. 1
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"Francis v. Cockrell, L. R. 5 Q. B. 184, 5oi (z87o) ; Dunn v. Brown Agri-
cultural Soc., 46 Ohio St. 93 (1883); Thompson v. Lowell Ry. Co., 170 Mass.
577; Hollis v. Kansas City Ass., 2o5 Mo. 5o8 (i97); Texas State Fair v.
Brittain, ii8 Fed. 713 (1902), and Texas State Fair v. Marti, 3O Tex. Civ.
App. 132 (igo2); Fox v. Buffalo Park, 2! N. Y. App. Div. 321 (1897).
" Mulchey v. Congregation, 125 Mass. 487 (1878); Jacobs v. Fuller &
Hutsenpiller Co., 67 Ohio St. 70 (19o2); Stevens v. United Gas & Electric
Co., 73 N. H. 159 (i9os), semble.
'Pickard v. Smith, io C. B. N. S. 470 (x86i) ; Bower v. Peate, L. R.
r Q. B. D. 321 (1876); Angus v. Dalton, L P 6 A. C. 740 (i88i); Hughes
v. Percival, L. R. 8 A. C. 443 (1883); Sturges v. Education Soc., 130 Mass.
414 (188): Benjamin v. Met. St. Ry. Co., 133 Mo. 274 (1895); P. PL v.
Morey, 47 Ohio 207 (i8go); McCarrier v. Hollister. i5 S. Dak. 366 (i9o2) ;
Congreve v. Smith, z8 New York 79 (1858); Chicago v. Robbins, 2 Black
(S. C. 'U. S.) 418 (1862); Cameron Mills Co. v. Anderson, 98 Tex. i56
(1904); Bonnaparte v. Wiseman, 89 Md. r2 (1899); Fowler v. Saks, i8 D. C.
570 (i888); Davis v. Summerfield, 133 N. C. 325 (i9O3).
"0 Covington Bridge Co. v. Steinbrock & Patrick, 6i Ohio St. 215; Flynn
v. Butler, 189 Mass. 377 (i9o5); P. W. & B. . R. v. Mitchell, io7 Md. 6oo
(i9o8); Joliet v. Harwood, 86 11. 11O (r877); James v. McMinimy, 93 Ky.
471 (i8g2); Wetherbee v. Partridge, 175 Mass. i8s (i9oo); Norwalk Gas
Co. v. Norwalk, 63 Conn. 495 (1893); the last four cases being cases of
blasting done by an independent contractor; in FitzSimons & Conwell Co. v.
Braun & Fitts, 199 Ill. 390 (iO ), it is held that one who uses explosives for
blasting does so at his peril and is liable for damage done thereby, even
though the damage is done by the concussion of the air caused thereby, no
tangible substance being thrown onto the plaintiff's land so as to constitute
a technical trespass as required in French v. Mix, 143 N. Y. 9o (1894), and
Fox v. Borkey, 126 Pa. 164 (1889) ; Colton v. Onderdonk, 69 Cal. i55 (1886),
accord: So one who engages a contractor to clear his waste land by fire is
liable if, by the latter's negligence, it is allowed to spread, Blake v. Christ
Church Dist., L. R. i8g4 A. C. 48; St. Louis, etc., R. R. v. Madden, 77 Kans.
8o (9o8). Its extreme expression is found in the statement of A. L. Smith,
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Many of the very states which refuse to follow Rylands v.
Fletcher in holding one, who erects structures or carries on
operations upon his land dangerous to his neighbors or the pub-
lic, answerable if harm come thereby to them, hold him bound
at his peril to have the structures carefully erected and main-
tained and the operations carefully carried out, even though the
structure or operations be such, that he can by no possibility
possess the skill or knowledge requisite for their erection, main-
tenance or execution or for the intelligent supervision thereof. 144
These cases therefore recognize a liability without fault on
the part of the defendant himself, or of any one with whom
he is legally identified and for whose acts by reason of the
relation between them he is legally answerable as though his
own. It seems quite certain that while the element of fault is
present, the liability is quite incompatible with rationale of the
conception that fault is essential to liability.
It is impossible.to enter into the causes which led to the
L J., in Holliday v. National Telephone Company, L R. 1899, 2 Q. B. 392,
at p. 400, that "it is very difficult for a person who is engaged in the execu-
tion of dangerous work near a highway to avoid liability by saying that he
has employed an independent contractor, because it is the duty of a person
who is causing such work to be executed to see that it is carefully carried
out so as not to occasion any damage to persons using the highway." Nor, in
such case, is the negligence regarded as collateral if it is in the very act which
the contractor is employed to perform.
1" In Massachusetts the liability varies with the nature of the use and
the extent of the danger involved therein to others. A certain use of property
may, of course, be unlawful per se and enjoinable as a nuisance because im-
mediately injurious to the property of an adjacent owner or his enjoyment
of his premises or so imminently dangerous as to substantially interfere with
the use thereof and depreciate its value. Another use may be so extraor-
dinary and unusual and so fraught with peril to others that it should be per-
mitted only at the owner's peril, see per Knowlton, J., in Ainsworth v. Lakin.
Another use may, while dangerous, be reasonably safe if carefully carried on
and may be "ordinary and usual and in a sense natural," if so he who carries it
on is bound to make it "safe so far as it can be done by the exercise of ordi-
nary care on the part of all those engaged in the work" and "he is responsible
for the negligence of independent contractors as well as for that of his serv-
ants," Knowlton. J., in Ainsworth v. Lakin, ante. In this class falls the main-
tenance of ordinary walls and buildings, Ainsworth v. Lakin; Cork v. Blossom,
ante, n. 139; Gross v. Graham, ante, n. 139; and such uses of property as the
storage of explosives, Flynn v. Butler, 189 Mass. 377 (905). On the other
hand if the use be one which will ordinarily do no harm unless there is posi-
tive carelessness, the owner is only liable if he or his servant by their negli-
gence cause it to be harmful. There is an obvious difference says Cockburn,
C. J., in Bower v. Peate, ante, n. 142: "between work which is properly done
no injurious consequences can arise" and "work from which mischievous
consequences will arise unless preventive measures are adopted" or positive
carefulness exercised.
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astounding revolution in the judicial idea of justice whereby
the old conception, that one who did harm should, because he
caused it, pay for it, gave place to the concept that it would be
unjust to transfer the harm which had befallen one innocent
party to another equally innocent, merely because the first was
the passive victim which the other by his activity had caused
the damage, and which therefore required as a requisite to
recovery that the defendant should be proved in actual fault,
moral or social. 145  But it may be said with some confidence
'"Legal redress for harm done was. it seems to be admitted, the result
of the effort of organized society, in its earliest stages, to preserve the peace
of the group or community from disturbance by those desiring to wreak
their vengeance upon the author of some harm done them. This desire for
vengeance, for the satisfaction of the brute instinct to make reprisal upon
the cause of one's harm, innocent or guilty, animate or inanimate, a desire
so strong as to lead to its satisfaction by force, if not otherwise satisfied by
some substitute therefor provided by society, whether by punishment of the
author of the harm or the payment of an equivalent to the person injured,
naturally and inevitably determined the nature of the redress which society
afforded by legal process and led to the original conception that he, who
breaks, pays. When this conception first appears in the Anglo Saxon law,
it has lost much of this vengeance element, such as appears in the Hebraic
rule of "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth." Compensation is given for
harm directly though innocently done, but punishment is only meted out to
the author of' it when he is in some actual fault. It is impossible to accu-
rately trace the influences which led the English courts to adopt the alto-
gether different view that actual fault is essential to the legal liability to
make compensation for harm done. The following not altogether improbable
hypothesis may, however, be suggested. Were this attitude peculiar to the
English law, it might be ascribed to the influence of the original criminal
nature of the writ of trespass which was the remedy by which the King's
Court gave redress for injury done by one subject to another; the allegations
therein, of violence and breach of the peace, though soon regarded as mere
surplusage, and the plea of not guilty would naturally tend to cause mis-
conduct to be regarded as a requisite to redress. Yet the original conception,
that one was fully liable for the harm done even by one's innocent, acts, per-
sisted in cases where no actual violence or breach of the King's peace existed
for centuries after the King's Court took jurisdiction of harm done by one
subject to another. And while there are many apparent survivals of the
earlier conception in cases of the sort which naturally arise in the early stages
of social development, the general principle that liability arises only from
fault, was deeply rooted in the civil law at the time of Justinian and was
stated as the general basis of all tort liability. Therefore, this conception
seems to be one which has spontaneously sprung up, and replaced the older
and fuller standard of liability, at what may be surmised to be substantially
similar periods in the development of both systems of jurisprudence.
So long as society could preserve its peace only by the satisfaction of
grievances which would otherwise lead to private feuds, it is evident that
the conception of the limits of legal liability must coincide with the individual
sense of grievance against those who in fact cause harm, and, as it could not
be expected that an individual would placidly bear an injury because the act
which caused it was beneficial to the general interest of the community, it
follows that the extent of legal liability could not be determined by its effect
upon the common good. But when the State became more powerful, it be-
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that the conception concerned itself entirely with the injustice
of requiring an innocent author of harm to answer for it. Look-
ing at the matter purely from the point of view of the plain-
tiff, his claim to be made whole is as just, his right as valid,
whether his harm is caused by accident or fault; in each case his
loss is the same, in each he is an innocent and passive victim.
The justice of his demand for compensation is not affected by
the subjective quality of the act which causes the harm. It will
not do to say that every one takes the risk of accidental harm,
but not of harm caused by the fault of others. This merely
states an effect or consequence of the principle that no one
oughlt to be required to make good harm which he has innocently
caused.
An entirely new system of jurisprudence might well con-
tain, as a fundamental principle, the conception that liability to
repair harm done is only to be imposed as a species of punish-
ment for misconduct, moral or social. But this was not the
original conception of the English law--on the contrary, it was
an innovation, though an innovation now some four hundred
years old. It came in gradually as a defense rebutting the
liability attacking under the older conception that he, who breaks,
must, because he breaks, pays. The defendant was allowed to
escape a liability, under which he prima facie lay, because it was
considered unjust to transfer the loss from one innocent person
to another equally innocent. The absence of fault, therefore,
came able to preserve its peace by pressure placed upon its citizens to respect
it, and so was no longer forced to secure it by removing the incentive to
private reprisals. And as the State, as it were, became more self-conscious,
it would come to have regard to the effect of its laws upon the well being of
the community. Being then able to preserve its peace without satisfying what
such individuals regarded as their just grievance, it seems inevitable that the
State should lay down rules which would have regard primarily to the public
good and which may be said to embody the collective sense of what is right
and convenient, as on the whole best tending to advance the interests of all
members of the community as a group, which may well be radically divergent
from what each individual regards as just as between himself and his fellow.
The natural tendency in any advancing civilization, to regard the utmost
possible freedom of individual activity as essential to the general good, would
therefore cause its encouragement to be regarded as paramount to the
preservation of the interests of the merely passive citizen; and would tend to
the abandonment of a rule of liability which, by making the actor answer-
able for all the harm he causes, would appear to unduly burden and so dis-
courage individual initiative, and to the adoption in place thereof of a rule
which relieved him from liability so long as he in his activities showed a due
regard for the interests of others.
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originally served as a defense which relieved an innocent cause
of harm from liability to make good the loss he had occasioned.
And while in new actions fault was regarded as essential to
recovery, it was still required because it was thought more just
to leave the loss where it had fallen than to single out the
innocent defendant as the victim simply because he was the
author of the loss. The fact that the plaintiff's harm is caused
by some one's fault is no good reason why one innocent thereof
should pay for it. Whether the fault is important because
liability is only imposed as a punishment, or because innocence
is a defense to the prima facie liability of the author of harm,
because of the injustice of the transferring the burden from the
shoulders of one innocent person to those of another equally
guiltless-the fault of one other than the defendant can logically
make no difference to the plaintiff's right to recover. It is cer-
tainly unjust to punish one man for the fault of another, especially
for that of one for whose acts he is not legally responsible, nor
should the guilt of a stranger invalidate his defense of innocence
when offered in bar of the liability prima facie answering from
his authorship of the harm. That the work is ill done may
show that the one injured thereby should recover against the
person in fault; it does not show that he should recover against
one innocent of all misconduct.
These cases show a distinct revulsion from the conception
that fault is essential to liability. The defendant, himself in-
nocent, is held liable because, by causing, for his own purposes,
dangerous work to be done, he is the author of the harm caused
by its performance without the precautions necessary to secure
the safety of others. This is a distinct reversion to the earlier
conceptions that he who causes harm, however innocently, is,
as its author, bound to make it good. They seem to be the
result of one of those illogical compromises between conflict-
ing conceptions which are inevitable where the public sense of
justice, having changed with a change in economic and social
opinion, leads the court to feel its way to the abandonment of
some long accepted conception, now felt, though perhaps only
vaguely, to be no longer tenable or satisfactory. Such com-
promises are the usual indication of a transition period in the
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development of the law, in which it is seeking to adapt itself to
new conditions and to accommodate itself to a changed public
sense of what is just and desirable. It cannot be expected, nor
in the writer's opinion is it desirable, that the principles an-
nounced therein should find a permanent place in the law: they
seem rather to be a bridge between the old conception and some
new solution of the problem of the proper distribution of the
loss necessarily caused by the individual activities of civilized
mankind, each in pursuit of his own interests. And as no one
indefinitely remains upon a bridge, but either passes over it upon
his way or returns to the shore he has left, so it is to be ex-
pected that the courts, which have in these cases parted com-
pany with the idea that no person need make good the loss he
innocently causes, will either return to that principle, abandon-
ing the position they now occupy, or that they will go on in
the path on which they have started and will work out some
new principle for the distribution of the loss, which will satisfy
the more highly socialised modern sense of justice.
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